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FILE No. **NE M 2/48** (Part)

TITLE: **CEASE FIRE IN MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN.**

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FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1761

TO WASHINGTON
8 AUGUST 1970. (NED)

NEM 2/52.

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ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 1761 OF 8 AUGUST REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO NICOSIA HQBFNE TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS
UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2317 AND CAIRO TELEGRAMS NOS 861 AND 863:

MIDDLE EAST.

WE FULLY RECOGNISE THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT DOING ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT
JEOPARDISE THE CEASEFIRE, WHICH IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. WE
ARE ANXIOUS TO HELP THE AMERICANS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OVER THE
U.S., AS INDEED OUR AGREEMENT TO ACCEDE TO THEIR REQUEST OVER
PRE-POSITIONING THESE AIRCRAFT QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNQUOTE
INDICATES. WE ALSO RECOGNISE THE FORCE OF WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THE
LIKELY REACTION IN WASHINGTON TO A REFUSAL BY US TO MEET THE U.S.
REQUEST. WE MUST, HOWEVER, KNOW MORE ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE
SOVIET UNION AND WE MUST CONSIDER CAREFULLY ARAB REACTIONS TO OUR
AGREEING TO THIS PROPOSAL.

2. YOU SHOULD ACCORDINGLY SPEAK AT ONCE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT
STRESSING THAT WE WANT TO DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP. UNLESS THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT ON RECONSIDERATION FAVOUR TURKEY AS A BASE FOR THESE
AIRCRAFT, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER
FAVOURABLY THE PROPOSAL THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE BASED IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM, SUBJECT TO OUR RECEIVING SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES
ON THE FOLLOWING TWO POINTS:

(I) THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACQUIESCES IN THIS PROPOSAL IN TERMS
WHICH WE CONSIDER SATISFACTORY:

(II) THAT WE ARE SURE THAT THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES ARE AWARE THAT
A BRITISH BASE WILL BE USED FOR THIS OPERATION: THEY WILL CERTAINLY
BECOME AWARE OF THIS FACT AT SOME STAGE. WE SHOULD MUCH PREFER THAT
THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THIS BY H.M. AMBASSADOR
SPEAKING AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

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For V. B.

PA

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3. AS REGARDS CYPRUS, WE NOTE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S ORIGINAL PREFERENCE WAS FOR A BASE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. IN OUR VIEW, THE USE OF THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS WOULD POSE THE SAME PROBLEMS AS A BASE IN THE U.K., WITH THE ADDITIONAL DISADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM CURRENT SOVIET INTEREST IN CYPRUS. WE THEREFORE DO NOT THINK THAT YOU NEED PURSUE THE QUESTION OF A CYPRUS BASE WITH THE AMERICANS, AND YOU SHOULD DISCOURAGE ANY RENEWED INTEREST THEY MAY EXPRESS IN THE USE OF CYPRUS AS A MAIN BASE.

4. AS REGARDS REFUELLING AND RECOVERY FACILITIES IN CYPRUS, WE FORESEE NO SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES BUT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INFORM THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT OF THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS. IN DOING THIS, WE WOULD WISH TO MENTION THAT WE HAD RECEIVED SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES ON THE TWO POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE.

5. WE PRESUME THAT THE AMERICANS ARE SAYING NOTHING PUBLICLY AT THIS STAGE ABOUT THE USE OF U.S. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, WE PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT WE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) COMMENT PUBLICLY ON MATTERS OF THIS KIND. IF HOWEVER THE AMERICANS HAVE A FALL-BACK POSITION FOR USE IF COMMENT CANNOT BE AVOIDED WE NEED TO KNOW WHAT IT IS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON THIS.

6. SEE MY I.F.T.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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CYPHER CAT/A
FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 404

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

8 AUGUST 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 404 DATED 8 AUGUST 1970 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION IMMEDIATE CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV
JISNE DI4 JIS GULF PARIS MOSCOW BAGHDAD AND BEIRUT.

RECEIVED REGISTRY No. 10 10 AUG 1970 New 2/48.

CAIRO TEL NO 859. JORDAN-ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.

THE U.S. EMBASSY HERE CONFIRM THAT THE U.S. LINE IS THAT NO
FORMAL AGREEMENT IS NEEDED WITH JORDAN ON THE MODULITIES OF THE
CEASE FIRE. IN DISCUSSING THE QUESTION WITH THE JORDANIANS, THEY
HAVE SAID THAT THEY WOULD ASSUME THAT THE JORDANIAN ARMY WOULD
CONTINUE TO CONFORM WITH THE EXISTING CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS.
THEY HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BE DONE
TO PREVENT VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE BY THE FEDAYEEN.
THEY WILL BE MAKING THIS LATTER POINT AGAIN TODAY.

2. THE JORDANIANS REPLIED THAT FOR THEIR PART, THERE WILL BE
NO REINFORCEMENT OF JORDAN ARMY POSITIONS DURING THE CEASE-FIRE,
AND THERE WOULD BE NO FIRING BY THE ARMY.
AS REGARDS THE FEDAYEEN, THEY INTENDED TO PREVENT ALL FIRING BY
THEM FROM JORDAN INTO ISRAELI HELD TERRITORY. THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER,
BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO PREVENT ALL FEDAYEEN RAIDS
ACROSS THE JORDAN. THE JORDANIANS ALSO MENTIONED THAT THEY WERE
CONCERNED THAT IRAQI ARTILLERY UNITS STATIONED NEAR IRBID MIGHT
BREAK THE CEASE FIRE AND THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY
OF GETTING THEM MOVED.

3. THE JORDANIANS TOLD US ON 6 AUGUST THAT IN THE EVENT OF A
CEASE-FIRE, THEY INTENDED TO REDEPLOY SOME TROOPS FROM THEIR PRESENT
"CONFRONTATION" POSTURE TO ONE MORE SUITED TO AN INTERNAL
SECURITY ROLE. THEY SAID THAT THIS WOULD MEAN FORWARD PATROLLING
ALONG THE WHOLE LINE OF THE JORDAN, NOT SIMPLY IN THE NORTHERN
PART OF THE VALLEY AS AT PRESENT. THEY SAID THAT THEY INTENDED TO
MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN FIRING WEAPONS FROM THE EAST
BANK, BUT THAT SINCE THE FEDAYEEN HAD FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN JORDAN,
THE JORDAN ARMY WAS UNLIKELY TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN GROUPS TRANSITING
THEIR LINES FOR OPERATIONS ON THE WEST BANK.

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- 2 -

4. THE U.S. EMBASSY HERE DO NOT KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN TOLD OF THE JORDANIAN REPLY, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE LINE THE GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN TAKING PUBLICLY. THEY ARE APPREHENSIVE OF THE EFFECT THAT A DELIBERATE ISRAELI LEAK COULD HAVE ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE FEDAYEEN TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JISNE DI4 AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE DEFCONCEN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS

MR. PHILLIPS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
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IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL. NO. 406

10 AUGUST 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 406 DATED 10 AUGUST 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
TEL AVIV, JIS(NE), DI4, JIS GULF, PARIS, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD AND
BEIRUT.

MY TELEGRAM NO 404: JORDAN-ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.

SINCE THE AMERICANS HAVE ACCEPTED THE JORDANIAN VIEW THAT
THE 1967 CEASE-FIRE REMAINS IN FORCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN,
THEY HAVE NOT MADE ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN ON THE TERMS
OR POLICING OF THE CEASE FIRE CONTAINED IN THEIR PROPOSALS.
THEY HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO KEEP THEIR SIDE OF THE DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE JORDANIANS TO AN EXPRESSION OF VIEWS AND HOPES, AND HAVE
NOT ASKED FOR OR RECEIVED ANY UNDERTAKINGS FROM THEM. IN PARTICULAR
THE U.S. EMBASSY HERE HAS BEEN CAREFUL, ON INSTRUCTIONS, NOT TO
SAY THAT THEY HOLD THE JORDANIANS 'TECHNICALLY' RESPONSIBLE FOR
FEDAYEEN VIOLATIONS (CAIRO TEL NO 859).

2. THE JORDANIAN STATEMENT OF THEIR INTENTIONS AS REGARDS THE
FEDAYEEN WILL PROBABLY MEAN IN PRACTICE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE
THEIR PRESENT POLICY OF TRYING TO PREVENT FIRING FROM THE EAST BANK
ACROSS THE RIVER. IF THE CHANGED MILITARY SITUATION MAKES IT
POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO DEPLOY TROOPS CLOSER TO THE JORDAN THAN
PREVIOUSLY, THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO ENFORCE THIS PROHIBITION MORE

/EFFECTIVELY.

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EFFECTIVELY. BUT THE JORDANIAN ARMY DOES NOT BECAUSE OF THE 10 JULY AGREEMENT WHICH GIVES THEM FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN JORDAN SEEM LIKELY TO INTERFERE WITH FEDAYEEN GROUPS ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE RIVER IN ORDER TO OPERATE INSIDE ISRAELI HELD TERRITORY, AND THE AMERICANS APPEAR TO ACCEPT THAT THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE AND MAY INCREASE. THEY HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAELI REACTION TO IT WILL NOT BE DISPROPORTIONATE.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE JIS(NE) DI4 AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE DEFCONCEN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.
MR. PHILLIPS

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 409

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
15 AUGUST 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 409 DATED 15/8/70 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, NEW YORK, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT,
DI4 AND JISNE.

BREACHES OF JORDAN-ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.

JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN STATED ON 14 AUGUST THAT
THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE.

13 AUGUST 1300Z TO 1530Z. TWO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT RAIDED THE
AREA OF NORTH SHUNA IN THE NORTH JORDAN VALLEY USING ROCKETS
AND CANNON. TARGETS APPEARED TO BE CIVILIAN. JORDANIAN AA
ENGAGED FOR TEN MINUTES. NO JORDANIAN CASUALTIES.

14 AUGUST 0910Z TO 1010Z. TWO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT INTERMITTENTLY
RAIDED AREA OF AL 'ARAMSHEH BRIDGE AND KHIRBET MARKA'A (SOUTH
OF NORTH SHUNA). CIVILIAN VEHICLES WERE ATTACKED WITH CANNONS
AND ROCKETS. JORDANIAN AA ENGAGED. 1 CIVILIAN WAS WOUNDED
AND ONE CIVILIAN VEHICLE DESTROYED.

14 AUGUST 1230Z TO 1310Z. TWO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT FORMATIONS
(MINIMUM ESTIMATE FOUR AIRCRAFT) RAIDED IRBID TOWN AREA USING
CANNON AND ROCKETS. A MILITARY CAMP ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF IRBID
WAS ATTACKED. 4 SOLDIERS AND 1 CIVILIAN WERE WOUNDED.

14 AUGUST 1300Z TO 1400Z. ISRAELI TANKS AND 155 MM HOWITZERS
FIRED FROM THE AREA OF ARAK ASFAH ON THE AREA OF TEL HUNDAKOOK
NORTH OF KUREIMA. 1 JORDANIAN WAS KILLED AND 3 WOUNDED.
THE JORDANIANS DID NOT REPLY DURING THIS ATTACK BUT DID OPEN
FIRE TO GIVE COVER TO PARTIES TRYING TO EVACUATE THEIR
CASUALTIES.

/14 AUGUST

14 AUGUST 1745Z. TWO ISRAELI HELICOPTERS CROSSED THE CEASE FIRE LINE AND FLEW EASTWARDS PASSING SOME SIX KILOMETRES SOUTH OF AMMAN.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

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16 AUGUST 1970

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
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M.I.P.T.

BREACHES OF JORDAN-ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.



MY DEFENCE ATTACHE HAS REPORTED AS FOLLOWS:-

ATTACHES RESIDENT IN AMMAN WERE INVITED TO VIEW SCENE OF ATTACK ON MORNING OF 15 AUG. FOUR ATTACHES (BRITISH, IRAQI, SOVIET AND AMERICAN) WERE ESCORTED TO A MILITARY CAMP ABOUT ONE MILE EAST OF IRBID CENTRE. THE CAMP, WHICH LIES WITHIN BARBED WIRE PERIMETER, IS SOME 300 METRES SQUARE. THERE IS A MOSQUE IN THE NORTH EAST CORNER. BUILDINGS ARE SINGLE STOREY REINFORCED CONCRETE AND SOME ROOFS ARE MADE OF CORRIGATED IRON. JORDANIANS STATE THAT EIGHT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ATTACKED BY SECTIONS OF TWO PLANES FROM EAST TO WEST. AT THE TIME ABOUT 10 SOLDIERS WERE IN THE CAMP OF WHOM 8 WERE SLIGHTLY WOUNDED. THE ATTACK, AGAINST THIS CLEARLY DEFINED MILITARY TARGET WAS MOST ACCURATE. ANY NEAR MISSES WERE WITHIN 50 METRES OF THE WIRE. THE CAMP IS COMPLETELY DEVASTATED AND MANY BUILDINGS APPEARED DESTROYED BEYOND REPAIR. VERY LARGE CRATERS AT LEAST 12 FOOT DEEP AND 20 FOOT ACROSS, 15 IN ALL, TOGETHER WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF SMALLER CRATERS, WERE SEEN IN THE CAMP AREA. TWO HOLES WERE ALSO SEEN SOME 20 INCHES ACROSS AND AT LEAST 10 FEET DEEP - PRESUMABLY ENTRY HOLES OF UNEXPLODED BOMBS. ONE OF THESE EXPLODED AT 150430Z AUGUST.

2. NO DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN BUILDINGS HAVE BEEN REPORTED. THE NEAREST IS ABOUT 100 METRES FROM THE CAMP. THE MOSQUE SUFFERED ONLY SPLINTER DAMAGE AND IT SEEMED AS IF THIS BUILDING HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY AVOIDED.

3. FEDAYEEN OCCUPIED BUILDINGS (A VEHICLE WORKSHOP) WERE WITHIN 400 YARDS AND AN IRAQI OCCUPIED AREA SOME 3000 METRES EAST OF THE CAMP.

/4. IN DA'S

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-2-

4. IN DA'S OPINION THIS WAS A MOST ACCURATELY EXECUTED ATTACK AGAINST AN EASILY IDENTIFIABLE MILITARY TARGET. DAMAGE APPEARS TO BE OF NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. LARGE NUMBERS OF PRESS AND TV PERSONNEL ARRIVED AT THE CAMP AT ABOUT 151100Z.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE, JIS(NE) AND DIA

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE DEFCONCEN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL. NO. 411

16 AUGUST 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 411 DATED 16 AUGUST 1970 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK BEIRUT
BAGHDAD JIS(NE) AND DI4 AND REPEATED SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

M.T.I.P.T.

BREACHES OF JORDAN ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.

I DO NOT OF COURSE KNOW WHAT ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS ARE, BUT ON
THE BASIS THAT THEY ARE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN A CEASE-FIRE ON
THE JORDANIAN FRONT THEY PRESUMABLY CALCULATE THAT BY RETALIAT-
ING AGAINST JORDANIAN REGULAR FORCES FOR FEDAYEEN RAIDS THEY WILL
ENCOURAGE THE FORMER TO PREVENT THE LATTER.

I BELIEVE THAT ON THE CONTRARY THEY WILL IN THE EXISTING DELICATE
BALANCE OF STRENGTH MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE ARMY TO
EXERT THE LIMITED AND NECESSARILLY UNOBTRUSIVE CONTROL WHICH IS
WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITY AND WHICH IS THE AIM OF THEIR LATEST
REDISPOSITIONS, NAMELY TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN FROM FIRING FROM
JORDANIAN TERRITORY, RATHER THAN FROM RAIDING ACROSS THE BORDER.
IF SIMILAR HEAVY ATTACKS FAIRLY DEEP INTO JORDANIAN TERRITORY
CONTINUE THE ISRAELIS RATHER THAN THE FEDAYEEN WILL BECOME THE
TARGETS OF MILITARY AND POPULAR RESENTMENT WITH CONSEQUENT ADDED
DIFFICULTIES FOR KING HUSSEIN.

2. ALTERNATIVELY SUCH ATTACKS COULD HAVE THE OTHER EFFECT BUT
WITH MORE FAR-REACHING AND DANGEROUS CONSEQUENTS THAN THE ISRAELIS
PRESUMABLY INTEND. CERTAIN OF KING HUSSEIN'S ADVISERS, WHOSE
VOICES WILL HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE RETURN OF SHERIF NASIR,
WILL PRESS EVEN MORE STRONGLY FOR GENERALLY "CLOBBERING" THE
FEDAYEEN IN THEIR STRONGHOLDS IN AND ABOUT AMMAN AS OPPOSED TO
TRYING MERELY TO LIMIT THEIR ACTIVITIES ALONG THE FRONTIER. THEY
WOULD LIKE TO DO THIS ANYWAY, AND COULD NOW IN THE FACE OF THE
ISRAELIS ATTACKS ARGUE THAT BY NOT DOING SO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT
ARE GETTING THE WORST OF BOTH WORLDS. SUCH ACTION WOULD UNITE THE

/FEDAYEEN

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For V.3.

T.A. 1-5
VK

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FEDAYEEN AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE IN DISARRAY AND WHILE A REPETITION OF THE BLOODSHED AND CHAOS WHICH PREVAILED IN THE JUNE WOULD BE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN, THE OUTCOME WOULD BE DOUBTFUL. AND IF HUSSEIN'S BID TO REIMPOSE HIS AUTHORITY BY FORCE WAS TO FAIL, THE PROSPECTS OF AN EARLY PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE WORSE THAN EVER.

3. IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD CONFINE THEIR REPRISALS (UNDERSTANDABLE ENOUGH IN THEMSELVES) TO THE MOSAIC SCALE OF AN EYE FOR AN EYE AND A TOOTH FOR A TOOTH, AND DIRECT THEM AT THE OFFENDING FEDAYEEN RATHER THAN AT THE GOVERNMENT, WHO HAVE SAID THEY ARE NOT THEIR PALESTINIAN BROTHERS KEEPERS, OR EVEN AT THE IRAQIS IN THE AREA, THE FORCES OF MODERATION IN JORDAN AND THUS ALSO WHAT ONE HOPES IS THE ISRAELI CAUSE WOULD BE STRENGTHENED. CAN THEY, EITHER IN TEL AVIV OR IN WASHINGTON, BE MADE TO SEE THIS BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE?.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE JIS(NE) AND DI4

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE DEFCONCEN WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK, AND SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MR. PHILLIPS

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